

Akinsola JIMOH

<http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/maritime-piracy-lethal-violence-nigeria.pdf>

Maritime Piracy and Lethal Violence Offshore in Nigeria



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Maritime Piracy and Lethal Violence Offshore in Nigeria	2
1. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT OF PIRACY IN NIGERIA.....	3
1.1 Introduction	3
1.2 Historical background	4
1.3 Political context of piracy and lethal violence	6
1.4 Economic context of piracy and lethal violence .	8
1.5 Social context of piracy and lethal violence	9
1.6 Methodology	10
2. DISCUSSION	11
2.1 Trend of lethal violence offshore and piracy attack	11
2.2 Weapon used and causes of lethal violence offshore in Nigeria	13
2.3 Trend of lethal violence offshore and onshore in coastal local government areas.....	15
3. MAIN FINDINGS	17
3.1 Lethal violence offshore and political conflicts	18
3.2 Lethal violence offshore and economic conflicts	18
3.3 Lethal violence offshore and social networks...	18
4. CONCLUSION.....	20
BIBLIOGRAPHY	21
ANNEX: DETAILS OF FATAL INCIDENTS OFFSHORE AS REPORTED IN THE NW DATABASE FROM 2006 TO 2014.....	23
LIST OF TABLES	33
LIST OF FIGURES	33
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATION	34

Akinsola JIMOH*

Maritime Piracy and Lethal Violence Offshore in Nigeria

Executive Summary

The Nigeria Watch (NW) dataset recorded 18,009 fatalities caused by violence in Nigeria's coastal states from 2006 to 2014. During the same period, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) dataset reported less than 20 deaths resulting directly from piracy attacks; however, the IMB does not record all fatal incidents at sea, near the shore, and in the creeks of the Niger Delta, such as gun attacks on oil offshore services and facilities, clashes among youth cult groups, and militant engagements with naval forces.

There is indeed a link between onshore and offshore violence. The spatial distribution of fatalities confirms it. Hence coastal local governments in Lagos State—namely, Apapa, Badagry, and Eti-Osa—accounted for the highest number of offshore deaths, according to NW, among coastal states in Nigeria during the period 2006–2014. As for the IMB data, it also shows that most piracy attacks occurred in locations around Lagos, especially at Apapa Port.

* Akinsola Jimoh has a PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Ibadan and is currently an IFRA-Nigeria Research Fellow. The author thanks Dr Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos for the painstaking review of his work. Any errors that remain are the sole responsibility of the author. Contact: akinsolajimoh1@gmail.com

1. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT OF PIRACY IN NIGERIA

1.1 Introduction

Maritime piracy is a serious issue, attracting a wide range of concerns and clarifications (Murphy 2008; Pérouse de Montclos 2012; Jimoh 2013; Okoronkwo, Okpara & Onyinyechi 2014). In the past decade, researchers, policy makers, and the media have shown more interest in the economic, political, and security implications of the phenomenon than in the fatalities associated with it. South East Asia, the Horn of Africa (HoA), Gulf of Guinea (GoG), and the Caribbean are still very dangerous waters for the shipping industry from the point of view of economic and human cost. Looking at the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) data alone may underestimate the human cost of maritime piracy; however, Nigeria Watch (NW) data provided insights into understanding the violent nature of maritime piracy and other events offshore in Nigeria. Besides armed robbery, the hijacking of ships, hostage-taking, and the killing of crew, passengers, anti-piracy personnel, and even pirates have become routine occurrences in Nigeria's coastal waters. Although piracy is not the only cause of death at sea, estimating offshore lethality from a holistic perspective reveals some interesting patterns.

Previous study has established the relative weakness of government to address the causes of violence in Nigeria (Jimoh 2013). This is on account of factors such as corruption, underfunded law enforcement, legal and jurisdictional weakness, lack of legitimate employment, and weak security apparatus. Extensive studies have also been conducted to analyse IMB data on maritime piracy showing the nature of violent attacks, including killings; however, the problem of definition has had an overarching effect on the results (Murphy 2008; Jimoh 2013). Clearer understanding of lethal violence

offshore, including piracy in Nigerian coastal states, was made possible in this paper by adapting a triangulation method, which combined quantitative data from NW and the IMB as well as qualitative data from interviews conducted with selected respondents from the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA). The aims were to discover whether lethal violence offshore is following the same trend as piracy attacks, and whether lethal violence offshore is following the same trend as violence onshore in coastal states.

1.2 Historical background

The Atlantic slave traders established outposts on the African coast, where they purchased slaves from local African leaders (Klein 1999). While traditional studies focus on official French and British records of how many Africans arrived in the New World, they often neglect to include the fatalities resulting from raids in the hinterland or the transmission of European diseases in the continent. The historical dilemma of the enslaved people was that they were marched to the coast for sale, where they waited in large forts called factories. The length of time in the factory varied, but this period resulted in around 4.5 per cent deaths during the transatlantic slave trade (Meltzer 1993). In other words, over 820,000 people died in African ports such as Benguela and Bonny. Meltzer's research puts this phase (middle passage) of the slave trade's overall mortality at 12.5 per cent.

Nigeria kept its important position during the great expansion of the transatlantic slave trade. At the initial stage, parties of Europeans captured Africans in raids on communities in the coastal areas. But this soon gave way to buying slaves from local rulers and traders. The vast majority of slaves taken out of Nigeria were sold by these local rulers and traders. As a result, European traders found it easier to provide local rulers with guns to fight the wars that yielded captives for export. Another legacy of this period was the violent collection of security levies by powerful warlords or kings who claimed monopoly on foreign trade and taxed Europeans who were trying to

access the slave market in the hinterland (Pérouse de Montclos 2012).

Subsequently, a European naval presence was established at Fernando Po in 1827, and John Beecroft was appointed the first British Consul over the Bright of Benin and Biafra (now Bonny) in 1849. Before this time, ‘piracy’ as such was unknown to the coastal people of Nigeria, even though the slave trade had been underway for many years. It was the extension of territorial jurisdiction by the British to Nigeria that introduced an international legal definition of piracy (Elleman 2010). Hence, the Slave Trade Act of 1825 provided that British subjects, including Nigerian (during colonial rule), who carried or conveyed a person on board a ship for the purpose of bringing him or her as a slave to any place was guilty of piracy.

After the end of the slave trade, lethal violence in the coastal areas of Nigeria was then associated with the palm oil trade. In other words, the dominant economic activity has always played a major role in fatal conflicts in the Niger Delta. Today, maritime piracy is closely linked to oil extraction, the fishing industry, and attractive cargo imported through the territorial waters. Specifically, since the 1990s, coastal communities have been under regular attack. This has created a complex sets of pirates, some of them akin to not very organized sea robbers. There are also those engaged in smuggling and all sorts of trafficking (including arms and refined oil), generally from Oron in Akwa Ibom State, as well as armed fishermen who stay close to the shore, steal any valuables available, and share the booty with their relatives in the villages nearby. These petty thieves operate mostly around Lagos anchorage and do not have any link with the Niger Delta ‘militants’. They are different from the operational sophistication of the pirate rings that have a political flavour in the Niger Delta (Pérouse de Montclos 2012).

1.3 Political context of piracy and lethal violence

Owing to the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea, maritime piracy in the area has attracted international attention. For instance, the US proposed to have their Coast Guards monitor Nigeria's territorial waters. In 2013, Washington also threatened to impose shipping sanctions on Nigeria for failure to implement the International Ship and Facility Services (ISPS) Code. America is clearly worried that maritime piracy attacks in Nigeria territorial waters may adversely affect her economic interests.

Another political dimension is the possibility of using illicit money from piracy activities to fund armed struggle in the Niger Delta. From 2006, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) fought for an increased share of the region's wealth and was responsible for some of the piracy attacks reported by IMB. Despite a multi-million dollar rehabilitation program, many of these militants still resorted to armed sea piracy after the amnesty granted by the federal government in 2009. While MEND may not have been a pirate group, it nevertheless established links between pirate gangs, some segments of Niger Delta militants, and powerful transnational mafias. Indeed, maritime piracy involves cult societies and organized criminal groups onshore (Antony 2003). This complexity blurs the lines of the definition of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which reduces piracy to "an act of bordering a vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in furtherance of the act" (IMO 1981).

The ranking by the IMB of maritime nations in terms of security risk also has implications for international shipping and, by extension, international politics (Okoronkwo et al. 2014). For instance, the IMB advised vessels to be very vigilant in Nigerian territorial waters (2011). This position is important to international shipping companies because it can entail economic sanctions and higher insurance premium rates. It is

therefore disputed by Nigerian officials. For instance, according to the Director General of NIMASA, on the occasion of the World Maritime Day (WMD) celebration in 2013:

Not all reported cases of piracy do occur. I also believe that there is an international conspiracy against Nigeria. Even this war risk premium that is been charged because they have blacklist the situation in Nigeria as a war situation. So vessels coming into this country have to be insured at a high premium rate. Therefore if you don't report that there was piracy attack yesterday, it will be very difficult to sustain that argument. We have also verified that many reported cases of piracy were not correct. There is an international conspiracy and I have maintained that argument and not proven wrong.¹

Beyond the controversy, the politics of maritime and oil resources actually contribute to explaining piracy and lethal violence in the case of Nigeria. For instance, elections have linkages with piracy because politicians fund and supply violent gangs with weapons to suppress opposition, as in 2003 and 2007 (Okoronkwo et al. 2014). After elections, the ruling class in power diverts public funds to buy private jets, hotels, and estates outside the country. Meanwhile, their criminal supporters retire to the waters to resume piracy in the name of 'freedom fighting'. Some of them have thus argued that they resort to crime to react to the illegal fishing of foreign vessels, as well as oil pollution which deprives them of their livelihood (Pérouse de Montclos 2012). Some attacks offshore were related to grievances against oil companies that did not respect memoranda of understanding with coastal communities.

Thus, the criminalization of politics and the politicization of crime have contributed to the modernization of maritime piracy. Attempts to explain the

¹ Akpobolokemi Ziakede, during an interview with Channels Television in Lagos, Nigerian on 26 September 2013.

problem from the angle of poverty are insufficient in the light of bad governance in Nigerian coastal states. Of course, this does not mean that maritime piracy cannot be motivated by greed and opportunism. Those who capitalize on violence to fund their freedom struggle can also engage in piracy as their means of personal survival (Okoronkwo et al. 2014). But while the former require significant social networks, the later suffice with or without them.

1.4 Economic context of piracy and lethal violence

Indeed, some attacks are executed purely for personal economic gain in a sporadic and spontaneous manner (Antony 2003). The level of corruption in Nigeria, however, has also increased the financial temptation where business opportunists are now engaging in oil theft and bunkering in order to live in style. Typically, the revenue profile of such pirates includes but is not limited to the theft of cash on board, sale of stolen cargo, and ransoms paid by victims. Death resulting from these operations is purely random and arises from confrontations with naval personnel or sometime armed guards on board vessels. The majority of piracy incidents reported by the IMB have occurred around Lagos and Bonny. While the economic attraction in Lagos is the Apapa Port, offshore oil facilities are the target of pirates at Bonny and the other coastal states, such as Rivers and Bayelsa.

Another fundamental economic issue that contributes to maritime piracy is the inability of the government to effectively utilize oil wealth to develop the nation. Nigeria happens to be very rich in petroleum, yet its resources have not provided the essential conditions and services for citizens to realize their economic potential in society. According to a World Bank Report, 80 per cent of Nigeria's oil and gas revenues accrue to just 1 per cent of the population, and 90 per cent of the population receive the remaining 20 per cent (Okoronkwo et al. 2014). This is the genesis of the 'resource control'

agitation that eventually produced ethnic militias and militants in the Niger Delta. Youths were then trained in heavy weapon handling and sophisticated maritime operation technicalities. These capabilities have been deployed to engage in serious organized crime, involving attacks on oil platforms, barges, and vessels.

1.5 Social context of piracy and lethal violence

The social aspect of piracy is the ability of sea robbers to network with other organized criminal groups both within and without the maritime domain. Pirates are well organized, having their own regulation. Like many criminal groups, they operate under rules backed by secret oaths and allegiance to leadership. This ensures that information concerning their network is rarely revealed, while they have access to intelligence through their informants within the security institutions. Pirates also connect with gangsters onshore through the so-called cult societies—that is, mafias and student fraternities that often draw their philosophy from the maritime world (David 2007; Pérouse de Montclos 2014). These social networks guarantee access to sophisticated weapons to confront patrol and surveillance security personnel during operations, black markets to dispose of stolen items, communication channels to negotiate and receive ransoms, and the protection of political ‘godfathers’ to infiltrate security officers indirectly.

In addition, pirates often make some alliance with corrupt security agents to achieve successful operations. Thanks to their social networks, they can thus hold hostages for an average of ten days while negotiating with the naval authorities and other stakeholders without been apprehended. For instance, the IMB reported:

On 11 January 2006, a Vanuatu flag pollution control vessel called *Liberty Service* was attacked by armed pirates. About 40 pirates armed with guns in three canoes attacked and boarded the vessel underway, vandalized the vessel’s

equipment and kidnapped four expatriate personnel. The vessel was engaged in a security role with 14 Nigerian naval personnel on board. Negotiation commenced and four kidnapped expatriates were released on 30 January 2006.

Fraud and corruption are the pillars of maritime piracy in this regard (Okoronkwo et al. 2014). They expose vessels to attacks and render onboard guards ineffective through a deliberate laxity in naval surveillance and sometimes direct involvement of security personnel in violent crime (Onuoha 2012). The Nigeria military, in particular, has a record of shady deals with militants to share the booty. Nonetheless, officers who sold weapons to the MEND were released and even promoted, according to a leaked Military Intelligence Investigation Report (MIIR) of November 2007 (Sahara Reporters 2010).

1.6 Methodology

The following research developed qualitative and quantitative analysis covering the 8 and 27 coastal states and local government areas of Nigeria. It relied both on descriptive statistics and deductive narration to study the political, economic, and social context of maritime piracy. To triangulate data, it used three sources: NW, the IMB, and NIMASA. While the IMB focuses only on piracy incidents as defined by the IMO, the NW dataset has a wider coverage of violence at sea. It includes offshore fatalities occasioned by maritime piracy, other forms of crime, and boat mishaps. Moreover, it records deaths of pirates as well as victims, as shown in the Annex, while the IMB reports only the casualties of the victims of piracy attacks. As a result, the IMB data on fatalities resulting from maritime piracy is rather far below that of NW (Table 1).

Table 1: Number of piracy deaths per year in Nigeria: a comparison between the NW and the IMB datasets

Year	Total number of Piracy deaths Offshore (NW)	Total Number of Piracy Deaths Offshore (IMB)
2006	7	1
2007	30	1
2008	7	0
2009	4	0
2010	4	0
2011	0	0
2012	5	4
2013	12	1
2014	3	0

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 Trend of lethal violence offshore and piracy attack

According to the NW dataset, violence caused 18,009 deaths in Nigerian coastal states from 1 June 2006 to 30 May 2014. Maritime piracy accounted for 187 deaths (1 per cent of the total) (Table 1). The IMB dataset reported less than 20 deaths resulting from maritime piracy during the same period. As for NIMASA, it published no statistics. In fact, it relies on the IMB data for safety planning and analysis. However, using such statistics underestimates the seriousness of lethal violence in the maritime domain.

Table 2: Number of deaths resulting from violence or maritime piracy per coastal state in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

State	Total Number of Deaths (All causes of violence)	Including Number of Piracy Deaths
Akwa Ibom	597	13
Bayelsa	1161	60
Cross River	1062	21
Delta	3314	25
Lagos	6152	25
Ogun	1857	2
Ondo	902	1
Rivers	2964	40
Total	18,009	187

When considering all the causes of lethal violence, Figure 1 shows that the most populated state in Nigeria, Lagos, records the highest number of fatalities, followed by Delta and Rivers states respectively. But when only piracy deaths are considered, Bayelsa State tops the list, followed by Rivers (Figure 2).




Figure 1: Number of deaths resulting from violence per coastal state in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)




Figure 2: Number of deaths resulting from maritime piracy per coastal state in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

2.2 Weapon used and causes of lethal violence offshore in Nigeria

Apart from deaths directly related to maritime piracy, armed attacks on oil offshore services and facilities, clashes among youth cult groups, and militant engagement with naval forces also account for lethal violence offshore in the Nigerian coastal states. Guns and other light weapons accounted for the majority of the fatalities, as pirates used firearms for operations most of

the time. Guns were also used to commit other crimes that led to lethal violence offshore. According to the IMB database, guns have taken over from knives since 2006. They accounted for 84 per cent of weapons used in 2010 (Figure 3). Narratives of the press archives in the NW dataset confirm this dominance of guns in the offshore killings reported.




Figure 3: Types of arms used for piracy attacks offshore according to the IMB (2001–2010 Reports)

2.3 Trend of lethal violence offshore and onshore in coastal local government areas

The 27 coastal local governments of Nigeria recorded a total of 4,104 violent deaths from 2006 to 2014 (Table 3 and Figure 4). In Bayelsa State, Southern Ijaw Local Government Area had a record of 448 fatalities, followed by Warri Southwest Local Government Area in Delta State, with 427. The most populated state in Nigeria, Lagos, also suffered from a high number of casualties in three coastal local government areas, namely Apapa (372), Eti-Osa (345), and Badagry (327). This pattern corresponds to the records of the IMB dataset, which shows that most piracy attacks occur in locations around Lagos.

Table 3: Total number of violent deaths per coastal local government area in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

State	LGA	Total Number of Deaths
Akwa Ibom	Eastern Obolo	12
Akwa Ibom	Ibena	23
Akwa Ibom	Mbo	42
Akwa Ibom	Oron	29
Bayelsa	Brass	71
Bayelsa	Ekeremor	68
Bayelsa	Nembe	118
Bayelsa	Southern Ijaw	448
Cross River	Akpabuyo	20
Cross River	Bakassi	108
Cross River	Calabar South	151
Delta	Burutu	268
Delta	Warri North	105
Delta	Warri Southwest	427
Lagos	Amuwo Odofin	119
Lagos	Apapa	372

Lagos	Badagry	327
Lagos	Eti – Osa	345
Lagos	Ibeju/Lekki	98
Lagos	Ojo	277
Ogun	Ogun Waterfront	2
Ondo	Ilaje	36
Rivers	Akuku Toru	209
Rivers	Andoni	75
Rivers	Bonny	178
Rivers	Degema	196
Rivers	Opobo/Nkoro	16
Total		4,140




Figure 4: Total number of violent deaths per coastal local government area in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

In the Niger Delta, crimes associated with militancy and the politics of resource control accounted for much of the lethal violence onshore. Indeed, the region is the home of armed ‘militants’ and has the largest number of oil wells. In 2008, for instance, offshore lethal violence increased significantly when gangsters employed by politicians to win the 2007 elections resumed full violent agitation in the oil-rich Niger Delta. The number of fatalities reported at sea jumped from 154 in 2007 to 170 in 2013. In the context of a proliferation of firearms, continued attacks on oil installations, kidnappings, and piracy has thus been a common feature of Bayelsa and Rivers states (Thom-Otuya 2009).

3. MAIN FINDINGS

In 2007, both offshore and piracy lethal violence were high (Figure 5). Out of 157 fatalities reported at sea, piracy accounted for 30, representing 19 per cent of the total that year (Table 3 above). After the 2007 elections, lethal violence continued in most of the coastal states, but at a lower level. The trend declined until 2013, when piracy deaths increased again to 12, while offshore violence generally in coastal states jumped to 170 fatalities.




Figure 5: Number of offshore deaths per year in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

3.1 Lethal violence offshore and political conflicts

In the Niger Delta, youths are easily hired by politicians to intimidate opponents, rig elections, and protect them (Thom-Otuya 2009; Okoronkwo et al. 2014). In contrast, the NW data shows that lethal violence due to political incidents in Lagos costal local government areas was far less than that of Bayelsa and Rivers, even though the number of deaths reported offshore was higher.

3.2 Lethal violence offshore and economic conflicts

From 2009, piracy attacks continued and a number of ships from various nations were seized (Theo 2010). Once pirates are on board, they hold crews at gunpoint until a ransom is paid, with amounts usually varying between 1 and 2 million US dollars, sometimes up to 4 million (ibid.). Even though ‘militants’ in the Niger Delta surrendered their guns as a condition for the granting of amnesty in 2009, the number of deaths offshore did not drop significantly. In 2012, for instance, the IMB reported four fatalities due to piracy attacks, higher than any previous years. In other words, pirates continued with their conventional attacks after the amnesty in the Niger Delta, particularly around Lagos and Bonny ports. But in the costal local governments of Lagos State, sea robbers had no linkage with the Niger Delta militants and were motivated purely by illicit economic opportunities. Unemployment among youths in Nigeria has certainly fuelled their involvement in criminal activities for the sole purpose of making money. In the Niger Delta, this includes drug trafficking, gangsterism, hostage-taking, armed robbery, sea piracy, and oil bunkering.

3.3 Lethal violence offshore and social networks

The NW database also shows that a large number of criminals are often involved in a single operation, a further proof of the extent of their social networks. In one case, for instance, up to 70 Niger Delta militants attacked

oil facilities to demand the release of their leader, Henry Okah, who was jailed in Angola at the time. In addition, the social networks of criminal gangs and militants in the Niger Delta ensure that they have access to military uniforms to attack ships, as in 2007 and 2008.

In Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers, specifically, social tensions play a major role through communal conflicts. As a result, fatal incidents onshore usually cause more deaths than offshore in coastal states (Figure 6 and Table 4). Only Bayelsa State records a higher number of fatalities offshore, including those resulting from maritime piracy. The situation in Lagos is different, as most of the armed robbers and youth gangs (“area boys”) who operate onshore cannot participate in maritime piracy because they lack swimming ability and know-how.




Figure 6: Offshore/Onshore/Piracy Fatalities according to NW (2006–2014)

Table 4: Offshore/Onshore/Piracy Fatalities according to NW (2006–2014)

Total Number of Deaths Resulting from:	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Cross River	Delta	Lagos	Ogun	Ondo	Rivers
Piracy	13	60	21	25	25	2	1	40
Violence Onshore	491	456	783	2514	4614	1855	866	2290
Violence Offshore	106	705	279	800	1538	2	36	674
All Causes of Violence	597	1161	1062	3314	6152	1857	902	2964

4. CONCLUSION

Corruption and dirty deals within the Nigerian Navy facilitate piracy attacks, which increased while offshore lethal violence decreased during the period under review. Although pirates are always armed during operations, they may not see the need to kill victims if the pirates cooperate with the security agents who are supposed to deter them. Aware that they may not get compensation and legal remedy, shipping companies and oil multinationals prefer to pay ransoms to pirates, without much resistance. This is also why the threat remains prevalent. Finally, it appears that the trend of lethal violence offshore often follows the situation onshore. Thus, addressing causes of violence onshore may also reduce the number of fatal incidents offshore.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alogoa, E.J. (1980). The Eastern Niger Delta and the hinterland in the 19th century In Ikime, O. (ed) *Groundwork of Nigerian History*. Historical Society of Nigeria. p249

Antony, Robert. J. (2003). *Like froth floating on the sea: The world of pirates and seafarers in late imperial South China*. Institute of East Asian Studies China Research Monograph. Berkeley: university California.

David, P. (2007). The rugged life: Youth violence in Southern Nigeria. In Pal Ahlawalia Louise Bethlehen and Ruth Ginio (eds.), *Violence and non-violence in Africa*. New York: Routledge.

Elleman, B. A. (2010). Piracy and maritime crime. In A. Elleman Bruce, Andrew, Forbes & David, *Historical and Modern Case Studies*. Rosenberg Naval War College Newport Papers. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press.

International Maritime Bureau (2011) Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the period 1 January-31 December. ICC/IMB, London.

IMO resolution A 504 (X11), adopted 20 November 1981.

Jimoh, Akinsola. S. (2013) Borderless security threats: trends in maritime piracy on Nigerian territorial waters and lesson from Somalia. In Albert, I.O., Aluko, B.A., & Isola, O.O. (eds) *The Security Sector and conflict management in Nigeria*. Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African studies, university of Ibadan, Ibadan.

Klein, Herbert & Jacob Klein (1999) *The Atlantic Slave Trade*. Cambridge University Press, pp 103-139.

Meltzer, Milton (1993) *A World History*. Da Capo Press.

Murphy, Martin N. (2008). *Smallboats, weak states, dirty money: Piracy and maritime terrorism in the modern world*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Nna-Emeka, C.O., Ouuoha, F. and Emmanuel, M. (2008). Nationalism Struggle over Bakasi and the changing face of diplomacy between Nigeria and Cameroun. *Africa Peace Review*, 4-8 (1), pp. 47-6

Okoronkwo, U.L., Okpara, E.N., & Onyinyechi, C.E. (2014). National Security and Maritime Piracy in Nigeria: A Sociological Discourse. *Humanities and Social science Letters*. <http://pakinsight.com/?ic=journal>

Onuoha, F.C. (2012) Piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of guinea: Nigeria as a Microcosm. *Al Jazeera Center of Studies*.

Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine (2012). Maritime piracy in Nigeria: Old wine in new bottles? *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, LLC (Online).

Sahara Reporters, 2010. Available from <http://www.saharareporters.com/report/secret-army-report-implicates-nsaazazi-ibori-alamieyeseigha-henry-and-sunny-okah-sale-militia> [Accessed 25 October. 2012].

Theo, Neethling (2010) Piracy around Africa's West and East coasts: A comparative political perspective. *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, vol. 38, No. 2.

Thom-Otuya, B.E.N (2009) Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Niger Delta: A threat to

national security in Nigeria. International Journal of Sustainable Development, vol 2 no. 5 PP 57-67.

ANNEX: DETAILS OF FATAL INCIDENTS
OFFSHORE AS REPORTED IN THE NW DATABASE
FROM 2006 TO 2014

Description	Year	State	LGA	Total number of deaths
JTF killed 20 militants returning from an undisclosed mission or a ceremony. A Shell official was also confirmed dead. It is unclear if the army opened fire first or not.	2006	Delta	Burutu	15
Attack on a supply vessel operated by Edison Chouest at Chevron's oilfield.	2006	Delta	Warri south west	1
70 Niger Delta suspected militants attacked an oil facility to demand the release of a leader, killing soldiers and abducting many contractors. From 2 to 9 soldiers were also killed in a second attack; 25 staff were still missing.	2006	Rivers	Degema	14
Corpses, which may be militants or soldiers, floated on the sea.	2006	Rivers	Degema	8
Speedboat capsized at the Takwa Bay.	2006	Lagos	Eti-Osa	5
Niger Delta militants attacked an oil supply ship. During a rescue attempt, a British hostage, 2 militants, and 1 soldier were killed.	2006	Rivers	Bonny	7
Militants attacked NAOC oil base and kidnapped 4 expatriates; 1 Nigerian died during an exchange of fire.	2006	Bayelsa	Brass	1
Gunmen attacked a vessel belonging to Hyundai; 1 Nigerian and 1 Dutch national	2007	Rivers	Bonny	3

killed.				
Sailor Torre Ariel Terco was injured while working on the S/V Scanner Freezer vessel <i>Queen Amina</i> (Atlantic Shrimpers Ltd); he died on his way to hospital.	2007	Lagos	Apapa	1
Militants attacked a production platform, killing a staff member of Petrostuff Nigeria Limited.	2007	Cross River	Bakassi	1
Nigeria's army recaptured an oil platform occupied by militants since 17 June after gun battle: 12 militants, 2 civilians, and a soldier were killed. Trying to escape, one AGIP worker drowned in the swamp from exhaustion. On 27 June, 3 soldiers, 2 Agip oil workers, and 15 militants were also killed. On 13 July, NDRC called on the Federal government to probe the alleged killing of 25 Ijaw by the JTF.	2007	Bayelsa	Southern Ijaw	21
An oil vessel anchored offshore on the Warri River exploded, killing 3 persons on maintenance duty; 1 person missing.	2007	Delta	Warri North, Warri south west	3
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Bayelsa	Nembe	1
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Lagos	Ojo	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Cross River	Bakassi	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew	2007	Lagos	Ibeju/Lekki	2

AKINSOLA JIMOH – MARITIME PIRACY AND LETHAL 25
VIOLENCE OFFSHORE IN NIGERIA

members kidnapped and killed.				
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Akwa Ibom	Ibeno	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Akwa Ibom	Mbo	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Rivers	Akuku Toru	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Ogun	Ogun Waterfront	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Lagos	Badagry	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Rivers	Andoni	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Delta	Warri south west	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Rivers	Degema	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Ondo	Ijaye	1
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Bayelsa	Ekeremor	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where	2007	Bayelsa	Brass	2

fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.				
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Bayelsa	Southern Ijaw	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Delta	Warri North	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Rivers	Bonny	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Akwa Ibom	Eastern Obolo	2
With over 30 boats and sophisticated weapons, MEND militants stormed a naval warship, <i>NNS Obula</i> , deployed to secure a Shell field. They held hostages to demand the release of Henry Okah, a militant leader jailed in Angola; 1 naval personnel and 1 rebel died; at least 5 people were injured.	2007	Bayelsa	Ekeremor, Southern Ijaw	7
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.	2007	Delta	Burutu	2
Armed pirates raided fishing vessels that belong to 4 different companies, killing 2 crew members. During the raid they destroyed communication devices on board; seafood and electronic equipment were carted away; 40 persons were injured, including both Nigerians and foreign nationals.	2007	Rivers	Bonny	2
Piracy in Nigerian territorial waters, where	2007	Cross	Calabar South	2

AKINSOLA JIMOH – MARITIME PIRACY AND LETHAL 27
VIOLENCE OFFSHORE IN NIGERIA

<p>fishing vessels were attacked and crew members kidnapped and killed.</p>		River		
<p>Militants dressed in Nigerian military uniforms attacked a military base in an area which is now a Cameroonian territory and made away with military equipment. 20 Cameroonian soldiers were killed. Liberators of the Southern Cameroon People claimed responsibility for the killings.</p>	2007	Cross River	Bakassi	21
<p>The fishing industry is under threat due to incessant attacks by pirates. This brought the number of seamen killed in January alone to 7 (including Captain Nana Tayo and Odede Onovirakpo) and 3 more in February.</p>	2008	Rivers	Bonny	2
<p>Armed-men in military uniforms attacked a ship, <i>MV Patience</i>, belonging to Total Oil Nigeria Ltd: 2 dead, including a crewman thrown overboard. The suspected militants also attacked a Pathfinder Nigerian Navy boat escorting the NLNG boats (Total, Texaco).</p>	2008	Rivers	Bonny	2
<p>Two oil flow stations belonging to Agip Oil Company were blown up; 11 soldiers were reportedly killed.</p>	2008	Delta	Burutu	11
<p>A member of the Nigerian Navy was killed and 4 other Nigerian seamen injured when gunmen in 2 speedboats attacked a security vessel working for Addax, a Canadian petroleum company, some 40 kilometres from the Nigerian coast.</p>	2008	Cross River	Calabar Municipality	1
<p>Attack on a Shell facility by Mend militants.</p>	2008	Bayelsa	Ekeremor	1
<p>2 boats transporting passengers capsized: at least 20 dead.</p>	2008	Rivers	Bonny	20

Gunmen on 2 speedboats attacked 2 oil service vessels: the <i>Falcon Crest</i> and the <i>Falcon Wings</i> . The pirates stole valuables and killed the Filipino captain of 1 vessel. The perpetrators escaped towards Cameroon.	2008	Akwa Ibom	Eastern Obolo, Ibeno	1
Gunmen attacked a security vessel in an oil field operated by Canada's Addax Petroleum, killing the Nigerian captain and wounding a crew member, as reported by navy and security sources.	2009	Akwa Ibom	Eastern Obolo, Ibeno	1
A boat ferrying students hit a submerged object and capsized.	2009	Lagos	Eti-Osa	2
Militants bombed an offshore platform of Shell SPDC and sank a military gun boat carrying between 20–23 soldiers.	2009	Delta	Burutu	22
Marine police killed a sea pirate Oluwa Dramola Odoka, suspected to have murdered a ship captain a year before. He reportedly also threatened to kill a staff member of a fishing company. Police shot him dead as he was escaping in a boat. Two of his accomplices were arrested.	2009	Lagos	Badagry	1
Two die as the result of an Argon Gas accidental explosion at Akpo FPSO.	2010	Rivers	Degema	2
A woman was shot and died after an attack on MT Junco.	2010	Bayelsa	Brass	1
Pirates attacked the vessel <i>Olokun IV</i> , killing a sailor, Etim Benjamin.	2010	Cross River	Akpabuyo, Bakassi	1
Pirates attacked a Bourbon-rented boat transporting several people working with Perenco Moudi FPSO, a French oil and gas company. They killed 2 civilian security	2010	Cross River	Bakassi	5

AKINSOLA JIMOH – MARITIME PIRACY AND LETHAL 29
VIOLENCE OFFSHORE IN NIGERIA

contractors and 3 policemen of the BIR (Bataillon d'Intervention Rapide), a Cameroon defence force involved in the security of offshore oil and gas installations. The pirates also lost 1 gang member in the attack, claimed by Africa Marine Commando (AMC).				
At least 3 foreign contractors (2 Indian nationals and a French national) working with Chevron Nigeria Limited CNL were missing and presumed dead after fire broke out aboard <i>KS Endeavor</i> , a drilling rig offshore operated by FODE Drilling Nigeria Limited. After 3 days searching, the corpses were not yet recovered. 152 workers on the water rig and barge were evacuated from the incident.	2012	Bayelsa	Kolokuma/Opokuma	3
According to the IMB, pirates from 2 boats attacked and burned a cargo vessel transporting crude oil. During the attack, which lasted 25 minutes, the captain and a chief engineer were killed. It was reportedly the third attack in the area in 4 days.	2012	Lagos	Badagry	2
One worker died because of an accident in gas production.	2012	Rivers	Bonny	1
JTF (Operation Pulo Shield) arrested 15 Filipinos and killed 6 pirates of a vessel (<i>MT. ST. Vanessa</i>) transporting stolen crude oil along the waterways, towards Bonny terminal. Three naval ratings were killed during the gunfight. On 3 July, <i>The Independent</i> reported that these people were not pirates but indigenes returning from funerals. A petition	2012	Bayelsa	Brass	7

(signed by human rights activists Omemiroro Ogedegbe and Ozobo Austin) was sent to the Chief Army Staff to protest these extra-judicial killings.				
Gunmen stormed a crane barge off the coast, killing 2 Nigerian Navy sailors and kidnapping 4 foreigners. The vessel (<i>JASCON 33a</i>) belonged to Sea Truck Oil Servicing, a Dutch Company based in Rotterdam. Those kidnapped were from Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Thailand. One source reported the death of 1 foreigner.	2012	Rivers	Bonny	1
Pirates killed 3 soldiers (JTF, Operation Pulo Shield) and a retired naval officer in the creeks. They were escorting Sterling Global Oil Service Company	2013	Bayelsa	Sagbama	4
<i>Jascon#4</i> , a vessel belonging to Chevron's contractor West African Ventures Limited, capsized and sank.	2013	Delta	Warri south west	10
A boat with about 166 passengers capsized off the coast of Cross River. The passengers were mostly Igbo traders who were heading for Gabon. Only 2 persons were rescued. Nine bodies were recovered.	2013	Cross River	Calabar South	27
The Nigerian Navy killed 16 pirates, who allegedly hijacked a vessel, <i>MT Norte</i> , loaded with 17,000 metric tonnes of petrol, in a gun battle. However, other sources reported 12 dead pirates.	2013	Delta	Burutu	13
Joint patrol teams of <i>NNS Jubilee</i> and <i>NNS Victory</i> killed 6 pirates. The pirates were taken by surprise as their efforts to engage the men	2013	Akwa Ibom	Oron	6

AKINSOLA JIMOH – MARITIME PIRACY AND LETHAL 31
VIOLENCE OFFSHORE IN NIGERIA

of the Nigerian Navy in a gun battle ended in their deaths. However, another newspaper reported 4 deaths.				
The corpse of Mr Babatie Gbaminidop, a boat operator, was found floating in River Ethiope after he was alleged to have been hit by bullets from soldiers who had earlier embarked on a raid to scare away illegal diesel dealers.	2013	Delta	Sapele	1
Three missing crew members of a ship were presumed dead 2 months after their vessel capsized. The anchor of the ship broke in Bonny Island and the vessel drifted with the crew members until it collided with a rock at the Bar Beach.	2013	Lagos	Lagos Island	3
A chief engineer of a Lagos-based shipping company was abducted by a group of pirates and died in a boat mishap in an attempt to release him. His corpse was recovered 4 days later.	2013	Cross River	Calabar South	1
Many individuals were reportedly killed by pirates, who attacked travellers on 2 speed-boats.	2013	Bayelsa	Nembe	5
A middle-aged man, Wiki Akpraka, was killed by a 3-man sea pirate gang while travelling in a speed-boat.	2013	Bayelsa	Ekeremor	1
A chief engineer, Momoh Momodu, and an able seaman, Blessing Odafe, died when their tanker barge sank after colliding with a bulk carrier.	2013	Lagos	Lagos Island	2
Six people were drowned in a river while returning from a burial ceremony.	2014	Delta	Burutu	6

Nigerian Navy killed 2 pirates in a gun duel and arrested 6 others.	2014	Lagos	Lagos Island	2
Three people (1 merchant sailor of a ship identified as <i>Medaillon Reedererei</i> and 2 pirates) were killed during an exchange of gunfire between the ship's armed guards and pirates. Two crew members also died while fleeing the embattled ship. The incident happened in the Niger Delta area, but the specific location was not stated. Based on the report, it is assumed that it occurred in the Escravos River in Warri South West in Delta.	2014	Delta	Warri south west	5

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Number of piracy deaths per year in Nigeria: a comparison between the NW and IMB

Table 2: Number of deaths resulting from violence or maritime piracy per coastal state in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

Table 3: Total number of violent deaths per coastal local government area in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

Table 4: Offshore/onshore/piracy fatalities according to NW (2006–2014)

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Number of deaths resulting from violence per coastal state in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

Figure 2: Number of deaths resulting from maritime piracy per coastal state in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

Figure 3: Types of arms used for piracy attacks offshore according to the IMB (2001–2010)

Figure 4: Total number of violent deaths per coastal local government area in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

Figure 5: Number of offshore deaths per year in Nigeria according to NW (2006–2014)

Figure 6: Offshore/onshore/piracy fatalities according to NW (2006–2014)

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATION

AMC	African Maritime Commando
BIR	Battalion d’Intervention Rapide
CNC	Chevron Nigeria Limited
FPSO	Floating Production Storage and Offloading
GoG	Gulf of Guinea
HoA	Horn of Africa
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
ISPS	International Ship and Port facility Security
JTF	Joint Task Force
KS	Kyrgystan (International vehicle registration)
LGA	Local Government Area
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MIIR	Military Intelligence Investigation Report
MT	Manual Transmission
NAOC	Nigeria Agip Oil Company
NDRC	National Defense Research Committee
NIMASA	Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
NNS	Nigerian Navy Ship
NW	Nigerian Watch
WMD	World Maritime Day