Patterns and trend analysis of violence in oil production and oil distribution in Nigeria from 2006 to 2014

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Nigeria Watch Project

Executive summary

Most studies on oil-related violence in Nigeria have unwittingly concentrated research efforts on oil production in the Niger Delta region. An attempt is made in this paper to demonstrate that oil distribution contributes more to fatality than oil production in Nigeria. Using the Nigeria Watch database as the primary source of data, the paper asserts that although the aggregate death figures attributed to the oil sector are lower than cases like road accidents, crime, and political-cum-religious-motivated killing, the number of violent deaths recorded between June 2006 and May 2014 in relation to oil distribution is triple the number related to oil production. While oil distribution accounted for 4,575 deaths, oil production events led to about 1,550 deaths. In addition, oil distribution has more lethal impact on the country than oil distribution. Apart from Kebbi and Zamfara, all the states of the federation have witnessed at least one fatal incidence from oil distribution, whereas oil production cases occur mainly in Anambra, Rivers, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, and Imo. The reasons are not difficult to understand: oil production is restricted to a few states in the Niger Delta area, while oil distribution

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activities cover the whole nation. Moreover, oil production deals essentially with crude oil, which is less flammable than the highly inflammable refined products involved in oil distribution. And, of course, oil distribution has a strong link with road accidents, which are rated as one of the main contributors to fatalities in Nigeria. In the final analysis, to understand the pattern and dynamics of fatalities in the oil sector, more research efforts need to be devoted to oil distribution.
INTRODUCTION

On 26 December 2006, a pipeline explosion at Abule-Egba in Agege Local Government Area (LGA) of Lagos claimed the lives of more than 600 persons. In a related development, a series of deadly clashes between the Joint Task Force (JTF) and militants in Warri South and Warri South West LGAs of Delta State on 13 May 2009 culminated in the deaths of some 593 victims. Such volatile outcomes and lethal consequences are usually associated with oil-related violence in Nigeria. Although oil violence may not be the major cause of fatal incidents in the country, its occurrences, especially those that have to do with oil distribution, have continued to trigger violence of frightening proportions at various levels. Perhaps one important question to ask is why such an important sector is associated with fatal incidents of such magnitude? One reason is that Nigeria’s economy rests heavily on crude oil, and hence it is only to be expected that commercial activities around oil become intense and highly competitive. In fact, most international businesses in the country are driven by the oil factor. The nation’s oil has attracted a contested platform of intense power plays by forces within and without the state frontiers. According to Obi (2005: 187):

Oil as a source of power and wealth is central to Nigeria’s federalism. It exerts a lot of influence by defining the object of power and by its dialectically being a source of wealth, poverty, unity, intense competition, and conflict. This manifests at the levels of oil production and distribution.

A second reason is found in the oil curse thesis, which has been sufficiently appraised in the literature and still subsists in a primitive economy like Nigeria’s. The argument is that the rise in oil production and the inevitable oil boom have the tendency to precipitate socio-economic instability—and ultimately violence
(Ikelegbe 2005). However, this amounts to an over-simplification of the problem, and it is necessary to probe beyond the oil curse theory and investigate the role of oil production and distribution in the complex matrix that makes violent incidents frequent. It is even more imperative considering the policy summersaults that the sector has witnessed in recent times. For instance, the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which seeks to achieve a robust and comprehensive reform in the dwindling oil sector, has reached an advanced stage. It therefore calls for a deeper analysis of issues for policy options at scientific level to be potent enough to remedy the degenerating situation.

In retrospect, the oil industry is a magnet for major stakeholders with various political and economic interests across the country. Although issues of politics, ethnicity, and religion are known to be volatile in Nigeria, oil-related violence also impacts significantly on the social environment. Previous analyses of oil conflicts in Nigeria have unduly concentrated research efforts on oil production within the locale of the Niger Delta (Ikporukpo 2002; Ogbogbo 2005; Obi 2005; Guichaoua 2009; E. M. Akpabio & N. S. Akpan 2010). But as the main findings of this paper will later suggest, the frequent movement of oil products to different parts of Nigeria on the country’s dilapidated roads makes large numbers of fatalities likely. At the same time, the inflammable quality of refined oil and the poorly maintained tankers that often convey these products predispose oil distribution to large-scale violence. Fatalities associated with oil production are largely limited not only in terms of their concentration in the core oil-producing states (with a few cases in Kogi because of a border dispute with Anambra) in the Niger Delta, but also in that they dealing with a non-flammable product, crude oil.
The intention of this paper is to dissect the gamut of activities that account for the contours of violent incidents within the oil sector from 2006 to 2014, with a focus on oil production and oil distribution in Nigeria. The data for the paper is extracted from the Nigeria Watch database, an open source of data on public violence in Nigeria. The database holds a collection of print media reports of violent deaths in the country since July 2006. The patterns of violent events that relate to oil distribution and production nationwide are illustrated with the aid of charts and maps to show important trends. In order to advance the central themes of this paper, two probing questions are instructive. Why is oil distribution more fatal than oil production in Nigeria? Why do stakeholders—authorities, NGOs, scholars, and security professionals—concentrate more on issues that involve oil production?

This paper has been carefully structured to provide adequate responses to these pertinent questions. The first section introduces the paper by presenting the general outline of the discussion. The second section takes a critical look at the political, economic, and social contexts of oil distribution and production, exploring their historical evolution since 1956 and their transformation after 2009. The third section discusses the methodology approach of the research and further addresses some specific issues that concern oil production and distribution. Section 4 presents the key findings, while Section 5 concludes the paper.
It is important to situate the subject of this paper within the political, social, and economic milieu of oil production and distribution in Nigeria. To achieve this, this section of the paper is divided into two sub-units. The first attempts to explore the historical background of the oil industry in Nigeria. Here, the evolutionary trends of the subject since the colonial period, especially from 1956 when oil was first discovered in Olobiri, through the military era, when the major infrastructure of oil was established, are briefly discussed. The second sub-unit covers issues that emerged in post-2009 oil governance in Nigeria.

### Historical background since 1956

Before Nigeria assumed its current ‘petrostate’ status, it had always operated as a purely agrarian economy. The abolition of the slave trade in 1807 led British colonial policy in West Africa to switch from trade in humans to appropriating territories for mass production of cash crops like cocoa, coffee, cotton, and peanuts. In the Niger Delta region, which was then home to the Bonny, Brass, Kalabari, Itsekiri, and Aboh people, it was the booming oil palm business that attracted the colonialists to the area (Falola 2009). By 1886, the Royal Niger Company has successfully secured a charter from the British government to formally administer the area as a protectorate of the British Crown, the Oil Rivers Protectorate. This charter empowered the company to govern and administer justice in the region in the manner it deemed fit, and it did not hesitate to use this machinery to consolidate its stronghold for maximum economic gains. These activities later ushered in a full-scale colonial government, which effectively imposed British foreign rule on the conquered territories in 1901. As the
clamour for independence increased in the 20th century, a
unique dimension to the political economy of the colonial
state emerged when crude oil was discovered in Olobiri
by Shell-BP in 1956.

The first oil export was achieved in 1958, spurring
the nations’ economy to grow at a tremendous rate. By
the early 1970s, revenue accruing from oil had become
the main source of state income. The consequence was
that the previous gains recorded in the agrarian sector
suffered a serious setback, as attention was shifted
principally to oil exploitation. According to Obi (2005),
the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities in
Oloibiri in 1956 played an important role in the country’s
leap from a cash crop-based to an oil-based economy. In
the 1970s, the nation invested heavily in oil infrastructure
through the construction of refineries, storage depots, and
pipelines. Subsequently, refineries were built in Port
Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna, while storage depots were
installed in Aba, Enugu, Ore, Yola, Satellite Town
(Lagos), Makurdi, Ilorin, Suleja, Kano, Gusau, Minna,
Jos, and Mosimi to facilitate the processes of oil
distribution (Eke and Enibe 2007).

The tasks of oil production and distribution lie
with both public and private business efforts. While the
public agencies are represented by the Nigeria National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its two subsidiaries,
the Department Petroleum Resources (DRP) and the
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Authority
(PPhra), private investors include those referred to as
Independent Marketers (IM) and Major Oil Marketers
(MOM). The MOM dominate the market with Mobil Oil
Nigeria Plc, Total Plc, MRS Nigeria Plc, Conoil Plc,
African Petroleum Plc, and Oando Nigeria Plc. In actual
fact, the concept of independent marketing appeared first
in the lexicon of the oil industry in 1978 when there was a
need to bring indigenous investors into the framework of
the oil business. According to Edoreh (cited in Ehinimen
and Adeleke 2012), there were over 1,000 registered
independent marketers in 1979, and by 2010 there were about 7,948 of them operating in various locations across the country. The MOM have also successfully established more than 2,218 outlets in various locations around the country. Despite this marked difference, however, the MOM still manage to control well over 60% of the market.

The distribution of petroleum products, which is the movement of refined petroleum from refineries to the final users across the country, is a crucial and at the same time a complex component of the production process. According to Nothingham (2004), the distribution component of the petroleum value chain holds the most promise for domestic initiatives. The Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMP) is tasked with wholesale supply, distribution, and marketing of petroleum products in Nigeria. There is a complex network of over 4,000 km of pipelines connected to more than 21 oil depots across the country. There are also more than 20 marine tankers that are used to ferry heavy products from coastal refineries in Warri and Port Harcourt to places like Lagos, where there is high demand. The situation has worsened in light of the fact that most of the pipelines are suffering leaks owing to lack of maintenance and, of course, the activities of vandals. This has left marketers with no other option but to resort to the use of tankers and trailers to transport the products. These practices have spelled doom for the booming sector.
Although the arrival of the oil economy significantly increased the revenue base of the state, it did not translate into a good life for the majority of the population. Citing Sala-i-Martin and Subranain’s analysis of the inherent paradox of the oil wealth, Guichaoua (2009: 18) wrote:

*In Nigeria, the GDP per capita in 2000 was roughly the same as in 1970. But the proportion of the population living on less than a dollar a day went from 36% to 70% over the same period. However, between 1965 and 2000, per capital oil revenue increased from $33 to $325. At the same time, income inequalities exploded. In 1970, the top 2% of income earners made as much as the bottom 17%; in 2000, the income of this top 2% was equivalent to the income of the bottom 55% combined.*

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1 Courtesy of NNPC/PPMC Bulletin (cited in Ehinomen & Adeleke 2012)
According to Obi (2005), two main factors explain this unfortunate development. First, the partnership between the Nigerian state (through the NNPC) and oil multinationals is such that oil production in Nigeria since the 1970s is marred by distrust and high-level technical irregularities on the part of the oil companies. As the multinationals are solely responsible for the oil production processes, the actual volume of production has always been shrouded in secrecy. The Federal government is basically a collector of oil rents but lacks the technical know-how to monitor and supervise oil production. Hence, the government merely relies on transnational corporations to determine the revenue accruing from oil production. This arrangement gives ample space for the government to be short-changed in this closed system of operation. Secondly, the distribution of oil wealth under the control of the ruling elites has further exacerbated the problem. Violent crises have erupted in many parts of the Niger Delta as a result of the sheer mismanagement and misallocation of oil proceeds. This argument is often situated within the oil curse discourse, which considers the discovery of petroleum to be associated with violence, corruption, abject poverty, and under-development (Ikpurukpo 2002).

The period of the oil boom also coincided with the militarization of politics. By virtue of their centralized command system, the various military regimes appropriated the resources of regions/states, including the oil in the Niger Delta, to foster their grip on political power and to perpetuate their anti-populist agendas. Consequently, the derivation principle\(^2\) suffered a severe

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\(^2\) ‘Derivation’ is the notion of allocating certain percentage of revenue amassed from oil and gas to the resource-producing states or region. It had been ingrained in the Nigeria’s federal system prior to independence in 1960. However, the derivation formula had dropped from an initial 50% to as low as 1% in 1990s, as a result of military autocracy. It is currently a 13% share of oil proceeds. Derivation also featured as the most controversial issue in both the 2005 and the 2014 constitutional conferences in Nigeria.
setback as parochial greed assumed centre stage in government affairs. Emphases for the sharing of national resources were placed on even development, special needs, and the population (Oputa Panel Report, cited in Ojakorotu and Olawale 2009). Hence, the Niger Delta region became an arena of dangerous protests against the perceived marginalization arising from the imperfections of the nation’s federal arrangement. This phenomenon has been described as ‘the minority question’ in Nigeria (Osaghae 1995). The painful effects of the military’s imposed economic policies, of which the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) held sway in the 1980s, further ignited civil unrest among the minorities and an array of civil society groups. It is in the character of the military to by-pass a constitutional solution and to subvert the supremacy of the general will. As a result, they resorted to extra-judicial and violent means to press home legitimate demands by minority groups across the country (Osaghae 1998). The problem of oil exploration in the Niger Delta can also be understood in this context. Again, in Osaghae’s (1998: 13) opinion:

The militant character of the Ogoni uprising, the high proportion of officers from minority, especially middle-belt, groups in military coups, the resort to rioting rather than the court of law by many minorities in the north, and the increasing use of sabotage of strategic oil installations by aggrieved minorities of the oil areas, are to be explained in this light.

For Perouse de Montclos (2012: 536):

(...)the struggle for regional control of oil resources is certainly political, as the militants advocate the so-called derivation principle and oppose the federal character of the Nigerian Republic, whereby richer states (in the South) are supposed to fund the poorer (in the Muslim North).

These protests, which usually played out on different platforms, including counter military coups, led
the military government to adopt two strategies to deal with the problem. First, there were some adjustments in government policies to soothe the aggrieved. For instance, the failed coup of Major Gideon Orkar in 1990 led not only to an increase in the derivation allocation to the oil-producing states from 1.5% to 3.0%. It also led to the establishment of the (now defunct) Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 in order to ensure that the resources allocated to the areas were properly managed (Osaghae 1998). Secondly, the military government usually responded through state repression, which is germane to most dictatorial regimes in the world. This was the case in 1995, when renown environmental crusader Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists were extra-judicially murdered by hanging.

Pre- and post-2009 scenarios

The attainment of democracy on 29 May 1999 after protracted military rule did not appease the violent protests that had enveloped the Niger Delta region. Perhaps the freedom of expression that democracy offers was taken to the extreme when armed groups began to mobilize and challenge the very foundations of the Nigerian state. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), founded by Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo, and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), created by Ateke Tom, led more than 100 other smaller armed groups to violently engage the Federal Government and multinational oil companies in a ‘war of attrition’. Asari’s NDPVF launched a series of attacks on oil wells and installations, disrupting oil production. The militant groups also attempted to control oil resources through oil bunkering, an exercise that involves tapping pipelines.

By September 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo had declared a full-scale war on the militants. The crisis worsened and Shell had to withdraw its personnel from two oil fields.
causing oil production to be cut by 30,000 barrels a day. The crackdown on militants continued until 2008. The Joint Military Task Force combed the area and raided hideouts of militants in the creeks. In 2005–2006, the involvement of the most sophisticated armed group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), also contributed significantly to reducing oil output. MEND’s activities in the region extended to kidnapping for ransom and sea piracy. In other instances, it became part of the political machinery for dealing with local opposition in the 2011 elections (Perouse de Montclos 2012). These unwholesome activities have caused thousands of residents to flee their homes and hundreds of people to lose their lives. In June 2009, the Federal Government declared its intention to grant an amnesty and unconditional pardon to militants as a way of restoring peace to the volatile region. The late Head of State, President Musa Yar’Adua, signed the amnesty programme, which officially began in October 2009. Before then, militants were given a 60-day period to surrender their weapons in exchange for training and rehabilitation.

SPECIFICITIES OF OIL PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

Coming to terms with a statistical analysis of fatal deaths within the province of oil production and distribution requires that I clarify two important methodological issues. This is because the study of violence remains one of the most complex and contested areas of research. The domain of violence was, for instance, extended by Galtung (1969) to include ‘structural violence’, that is, physical or psychological injuries that may arise from unjust social and political relations. Hence, one of the methodological questions that this research raises is how to measure the intensity of violence without having to overstate the problem. The second pertinent question relates to how the data sources
can be representative enough without violating the credibility of the research findings. First, it is almost impossible to exhaustively measure the weight of violence that attends cases of oil production and distribution in Nigeria, especially as it involves generating consistent numerical data that will stand the test of time. What seems achievable under such conditions is to streamline the focus of the research to the numbers of deaths. Focusing on the body count helps to identify violent incidents that record at least one death. On the second issue, the research examined only open sources, which the Nigeria Watch database has so far provided generously with regards to its online data on fatalities in Nigeria. The police are grossly ineffective in the collation of reliable data for the purposes of accuracy and record keeping. The Nigeria Watch database is primarily based on print media-based reports on violent incidents in a consistent manner. It also crosschecks from other sources such as the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), human rights organisations, and other credible sources to provide a clear picture of events. The preferred media reports have been carefully selected to give the process a national spread. Although the database is limited in terms of coverage, it remains a potent tool for trend analysis of events. Moreover, print media is the only credible open source that is consistent and accessible to the public. For all its shortcomings, the Nigeria Watch database is able to highlight and underscore valid assumptions about the violence associated with oil production and oil distribution in Nigeria.
KEY FINDINGS

Major causes of violent deaths in Nigeria (2006–2014)

Figure 2 summarizes the global picture of fatalities within the period of this research (June 2006 to May 2014). It shows that crime, car accidents, religious clashes, political violence, fire explosions, and oil distribution are the main drivers of fatalities in Nigeria. At present, the spotlight is on the Boko Haram insurgency as a cause of major violence in the country, and this violence is largely interpreted in the database as political and religious. In other words, oil distribution and production are not the main causes of violence in the country. Nevertheless, it is important to compare the figures in oil production with oil distribution. With 4,575 deaths, oil distribution accounted for the sixth-highest number of violent cases in Nigeria. Oil production, which recorded 1,550 deaths, accounted for the tenth-highest number. The combination of the two figures accounts for some 6,125 deaths.

![Figure 2 - Number of violent deaths in Nigeria, per cause (2006–2014)](image-url)
Fatalities caused by oil distribution (2006–2014)

Figure 3 shows there has been a downward trend in annual violent deaths in oil distribution, except in the years 2009 and 2012. In fact, 2009 had an exceptionally high number of fatalities, with a staggering casualty figure of 1,089. The major event here was an outbreak of violence in Warri South and Warri South West LGAs, where a fatal clash between soldiers and militants over illegal refineries and oil bunkering led to the loss of 593 lives. The fatality record of 957 in 2006 was also extraordinarily high, bearing in mind that the figure covers just seven months (June–December). Road accidents and pipeline vandalism formed the main drivers of oil violent deaths in 2006. But it is important to note that the general trend since 2006 has been one of decrease, aside from the aforementioned years (2009 and 2012). As a matter of fact, 2014 has presented the lowest number of violent deaths (23), even though it must be admitted that the figure represents just the first five months of the year. One cannot readily offer a cogent explanation for the marked variations in the fatality profile of the 8-year study, but what seems convincing is the fact that violent events are products of increasingly intense activities (both legal and illegal) around oil. A further study of the database found that 2008 witnessed 122 incidences, most of which revolved around the activities of the JTF. There were 40 deadly events in 2006, despite its 7-month coverage. The years 2013 and 2014 witnessed 25 and 5 events, respectively. The case of 2014, with just 5 incidents, is partially understandable in that it covers just 5 months (January–May).
Figure 3 - Annual number of deaths caused by oil distribution (2006–2014)

Figure 4 shows that 34 states in Nigeria, including FCT (Abuja), have witnessed fatalities in oil distribution. With the exception of Kebbi and Zamfara states, every state across the country has recorded at least one event of violence due to oil distribution. Again, of the total number of 4,575 deaths attributed to oil distribution, over 1,200 cases were recorded in Lagos State alone, followed by Delta State with about 850 fatalities. Other high-risk states for violent death from oil distribution include Rivers, Edo, Oyo, Ogun, and Bayelsa. There are two fundamental issues that could explain this trend. First, states that have a high demand for Primum Motor Spirit (PMS) are most prone to fatalities. The level of demand for petroleum products can at times be determined by the population density and the level of industrial activities in the states. Lagos and Delta, for instance, fit perfectly into this context. Lagos sea-terminals provide the routes through which oil products and other heavy goods are imported into the country, to service the South West and some northern states. Hence, heavy traffic of trailers and light vehicular movements are common features on Lagos roads. The second point to make is the obvious fact that oil distribution activities are more fatal outside the states of oil production. For instance, the total death figure observable within the oil production areas is less than
2,000, whereas about 4,575 fatal deaths occurred in other parts of the country as a result of oil distribution. The frequency of fatal events in oil distribution between June 2006 and May 2014 also shows the high-risk states to be Bayelsa (99), Lagos (79), Delta (56), and Rivers (51). Oil spillage and the activities of the JTF are largely responsible for the frequency of violence in Bayelsa State. In Delta, road accidents that involved petro tankers, kerosene explosion, pipeline vandalism, and piracy were major causes of fatal incidents. In Lagos, tanker explosions, road accidents, robberies at fuel stations, oil theft, and pipeline vandalism loomed large.

**Figure 4** - Deaths due to oil distribution, by state (2006 – 2014)

The following map shows that the incidents of oil distribution cover virtually all parts of country, with Lagos and Delta representing the areas of highest casualties. The graph indicates that only Kebbi and Zamfara states did not have records of fatality arising from oil distribution.
When the above cases are mapped as relative violent figures (i.e. per 100,000 inhabitants), the result shows Delta as the most violent state, followed by Lagos and Rivers states. Normally, the absolute figures concentrate on Lagos State as the most fatal in terms of frequency and intensity of the problem. However, the risk assessment analysis shows Delta as the most dangerous state for oil distribution because it has the highest relative violent death figures.
Figure 6 - Fatality rates resulting from oil distribution (2006–2014)

Fatalities caused by oil production (June 2006–May 2014)

Between 2006 and 2014, oil production activities precipitated some marked incidences of violence, mainly and quite obviously in the zones of extraction. As shown in Figure 7, there was a steady increase in the number of violent deaths recorded between 2006 and 2009, after which there was a sharp drop from 722 to 70. The trend picked up again from 2012 to 2013 but witnessed another sharp drop to only one death related to oil production in 2014. Generally, oil production has been less fatal compared with oil distribution.

Figure 7 - Violent death caused by oil production (2006–2014)

Since oil production activities take place mainly within the Niger Delta states, it is only logical that most of the violence is concentrated in this region. The oil rich states (Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Abia, Anambra, and Imo) present various degrees of fatalities arising from oil production activities. In terms of
frequency, Bayelsa is the most affected, with over 117 incidents recorded between June 2006 and May 2014, followed by Rivers and Delta states with 65 and 35 events, respectively. Some 14 cases were observed in Kogi State due to frequent clashes over oil deposits at the border between Aguleri and Achewno communities in Anambra and Kogi states. However, it is possible that some of the violence documented in Anambra was also recorded in the cases that involved Kogi State. The aggregate death figure for oil production stands at 1,550. This is a far cry from the figure for oil distribution, which accounted for 4,575 deaths. This is a clear indication that oil distribution activities are more deadly than oil production. In fact, deadly mishaps are more likely to occur during oil distribution than during oil production.

The above data can further be mapped in Figure 9, to show the geographical concentration of oil production violence in Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Imo, Anambra, and Cross River states. Again, Delta State has the highest fatality profile in oil production, while
Rivers, Bayelsa, Imo, Anambra, Kogi, Cross River, and Abia states follow in that order. The issues that led to violence in those states also vary considerably. In Bayelsa, the issues revolve mainly around oil spillage and the clashes between the JTF and militants. JTF attacks and pipeline vandalism were also prevalent in Delta. Of particular note was a deadly encounter between the JTF and militants in May 2009 that claimed the lives of more than 500 people, including women and children.

![Figure 9 - Map of deaths resulting from oil production (2006–2014)](image)

The rate of violent deaths related to oil production is shown in Figure 10. From this analysis, Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers appear as the most dangerous states. This is not really surprising, considering the fact that they are the core oil-producing states of the Niger Delta.
Perhaps, the first point to make in this section is that oil causes fewer than 10% of the fatalities reported in violent incidents in Nigeria, much fewer than road accidents, crime, and religious or political clashes. Figure 2 clearly demonstrates this point by rating oil violence, that is, oil distribution and production combined, as the sixth-highest cause of lethal violence in Nigeria. However, oil-related violence has been rather brutal in terms of intensity and national spread. An important fact is that oil distribution activities have a strong link with road accidents. Most fatal accidents on the highways are indeed connected to the movement of petroleum products to different parts of the country. The point was made earlier in this paper that the demand for PMS is in a way directly proportional to the number of violent deaths that are likely to occur in a particular location. Hence, locations like Lagos, Delta, and Rivers states have always had high fatality cases because of the concentration of industries in these states.
Secondly, from the analyses presented above, oil production and oil distribution differ with respect to their contribution to lethal violence across the country. Oil distribution is far more violent than oil production. This can be explained in a number of ways. In the first instance, the activities that involve oil distribution are nationwide, while oil production operations are restricted to the Niger Delta region, with a few cases in Kogi State because of its border problems with Anambra State. The impact of oil distribution on violence is therefore more widespread geographically. In fact, the only states that did not have incidents of oil distribution violence since 2006 are Kebbi and Zamfara (Figure 4). By contrast, oil production violence took place only in states like Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Anambra, Imo, and Kogi.

Other factors that make oil distribution a more deadly operation than oil production are worth mentioning. The point was previously made that oil distribution is closely tied to road accidents, which are one of the main causes of fatalities in Nigeria. The dilapidated state of the roads, poor maintenance of tankers, and rampant reckless driving have made the movement of petroleum products to the various parts of the country dangerous undertakings. This point is germane considering the current comatose state of the rail system and, of course, the fact that pipelines have become major targets for destruction by vandals and those creating oil bunkers. In addition, the poorly maintained status of most heavy vehicles, that is, trailers being used to convey these products, makes oil distribution activities more prone to fatal incidents. Since petroleum products are highly inflammable, they easily cause lethal fire explosions whenever accidents involving petrol tankers occur. Taiwo (2013) listed mechanical, environmental, institutional, natural, and supernatural factors as responsible for road accidents on the highways (see also Bum 2012). All these variables come into play whenever
CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is important to stress at this concluding stage that the multifarious violence that constantly besets the oil industry is not the main source of fatalities in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the impact of the oil industry is far from insignificant, and it also varies with respect to scope and intensity according to which aspect of the industry we consider. One of the issues raised in this paper is the fact that oil distribution is considerably more deadly than oil production. The analyses also show that oil production is concentrated in the Niger Delta region, while oil distribution is a nationwide affair. There is also a marked discrepancy in both absolute and relative number of deaths for oil distribution and oil production. All these are pointers to the complex contribution of oil distribution to the violent incidences that frequently assail the oil industry. This paper advocates further empirical studies in order to gain more insights into the dynamics of oil distribution and production in Nigeria.
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